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INTRODUCTION 
The following study was performed in an effort to learn more 
about decisions made by people. From studies such as Bowman, (1963), 
and Goldberg, (1968), it is known that certain models predict the real-
world outcomes better than other models. The class of decision pro­
blems considered here are those that can be analyzed by the lens model. 
The lens model was developed by Brunswik, (1952), and a detailed 
description of it applied to clinical judgements was published by 
Hammond, (1955). Since the appearance of these two papers the literature 
dealing with the lens model has expanded rapidly. Because the lens 
model is a fairly recent development there are many types of experi­
mental areas to be explored. In this study the area of the impact of 
error in feedback in a multiple-cue decision problem will be explored. 
The results of this study indicate that subjects do not predict 
outcomes in high error in feedback conditions as well as they do for 
low error in feedback. Also it was found that the degradation of the 
subjects' ability to predict outcomes was primarily due to the failure 
of their estimates to fit the linear regression equation of their 
estimates, rather than to the failure of the linear regression equation 
estimates of the subjects' predictions of the outcome variable to 
correlate with the linear regression equation estimates of the outcome 
variable values. The study makes clear the development and significance 
of such terms as error in feedback, linear regression, and correlations, 
as used herein. 
CHAPTER I 
LENS MODEL 
Basic Terminology of the Lens Model 
Consider the following simple decision making situation. An 
individual works all day in a windowless office. Each day just before 
the end of work, a friend visits him and reports some data about the 
outside weather conditions. The friend reports such things as temper­
ature, the brightness of the sky and the humidity. The office worker 
uses these data to decide whether or not he should take his umbrella 
with him when he leaves. Finally, he receives some feedback on the 
correctness of his decision when he leaves the office and discovers 
the actual weather conditions for himself. 
Several features of this situation are of interest. First, the 
decision is based on an estiamte of some aspect of external reality 
which is not itself directly observed. Second, the data on which the 
estimate is based are subject to error, in that they are not uneqi-
vocally related to the external state of interest. Finally, the feed­
back the decision maker receives is itself subject to error, in that 
the situation he observes may have changed from that generating his 
data. It will be apparent that these characteristics describe a 
rather large range of decision making situations. 
An approach to the analysis of such situations is provided by 
Brunswik's lens model. (Brunswik, (1952); Hammond, (1955)). The basic 
elements of this model are shown in Figure 1. 
8A 
Figure 1. Basic Elements of Lens Model 
In the usual terminology for this model, the decision maker is seen 
as using a set of information-hearing "cues" to arrive at an 
estimate YS of the value of a "Distal" or "Criterion" variable YE. 
Each cue is related to the distal variable in some way, the extent 
of this relationship being indicated by the correlation coefficient 
R(e, i), termed the "Ecological Validity" of the î *1 cue. Similarly, 
the extent of the relationship between each cue and the decision maker 
estimate is indicated by the correlation coefficient R(S,i), termed 
the subject's "Utilization Coefficient" of the î *1 cue. Each pair 
of cues will, in general, show some interrelationship, indicated by 
the cue intercorrelations R(i , j ) . A simple measure of the decision 
maker's performance is provided by the correlation R(YE, YS), the. 
"Achievement Index." 
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Conceptual Development of the Lens Model 
The lens model is concerned with situations in which a person 
finds himself confronted with different sources of information relevant 
to some distal variable, which can be used to estimate an outcome. The 
sources of information will be called cues. For example, cues can be 
symptoms that occur together and characterize a particular disease. 
A clinician looking at the symptoms must make some decision. "Exactly 
how he arrives at a decision is not known even to him." (Hammond, (1955)) 
Since a clinician does not know how he arrives at a decision 
the information flow between clinician and patient will be considered. 
For example, the following situation can exist. 
Clinician Patient information flow 
The above can represent the clinician studying his patient by way of 
a test or just by examination. Since a clinician is subject to error 
he should himself be analyzed. For example, the situation can be 
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information flow 
indicates statistics can be used to compare 
The difference in this latter reformulation of the situation is that 
a model of the clinician has been added. The dotted line indicates 
that the model and clinician can be compared by the use of statistics. 
The model used will be the lens model but it must be remembered that 
we are studying decision problems where the lens model is the appro--
priate model to use. For some other decision problems, (Bowman, (1963)). 
the lens model would not be the appropriate model. 
Formulation of the Lens Model 
The lens model represented in Figure 1 will now be developed. 
Before getting started however, note that the distal variable side of 
the lens model may not be known. If the distal variable side is not 
known, the value of the formulation is less clear. Knowledge of YE 
is central to the statistics of the lens model. For example, the 
achievement of the clinician is defined as the simple correlation 
between YE and YS and is denoted RA. The formulation, therefore, is 
for cases where YE can be determined with some accuracy. In many 
decision making situations, however, YE is not known. Rather some 
error prone estimate of YE is the only feedback available. For example, 
feedback on a patient's survival time, after estimating disease 
severity as YE, is error prone. The effect of the amount of error 
in feedback is one of the major topics to be considered in this thesis 
and it will be analyzed later. 
To start to develop the lens model a decision making situation 
will be considered. The clinician confronted with a decision making 
situation will consider his cues, Denote the cues as x. and a 
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schematic of the cues can be represented as follows: 
In considering the cues, the clinician will consider past and present 
information available to him. The clinician in considering his infor­
mation will try to diagnose the patients present and future states. 
The clinician's decision is his estimate and is denoted YS. Because 
his decision may be wrong the actual state of the patient is called 
a distal variable and is denoted as YE. The schematic can now be 
expanded to the following: 
where R(e,i) is called the ecological vality of the i cue and it is 
the simple correlation between YE and x^. R(s,i) is called the utili­
zation coefficient of the î *1 cue and it is the simple correlation 
between YS and x^. 
Once a decision is made the clinician must wait to observe the 
YE that occurs. The correlation of YS to YE over time can be looked 
6 
on as achievement and is denoted as RA. The final schematic below is 
called the lens model. 
where x^, YE, YS, R(e,i), R(s,i) and RA are as defined earlier. 
Further Development of Lens Model Correlations 
A mathematical formalization of the general lens model was pro­
vided by Hursch, Hammond and Hursch, (1964), and refined by Tucker, 
(196U). The major points of these formalizations are summarized in 
Appendix IV of the present study. 
Of the various statistics available for describing the problem-
response system represented by the lens model, three are of particular 
interest for the present research. The first achievement, denoted as 
RA is defined as the correlation between the distal variable and the 
subject's response. Achievement is the appropriate word for this 
correlation since it gives a simple over all measure of the subject's 
ability to estimate distal variable values in a given problem. A 
7 
A 
second measure G, is the simple correlation between-YE, the best fit 
A 
linear prediction of YE from the cues, and YS, the best fit linear 
prediction of YS from the cues. Therefore G, reflects whether or not 
the linearity of the subject's estimates of the distal variable matches 
the linearity that exists in the distal variable values. A linear 
model is used because it is known to be a good predictor in lens model 
A ' 
type decision problems. Finally, the correlation between YS and YS 
indicates how well the linear model of the subject's estimates actually 
' A 
fits the subject's estimates. The correlation between YS and YS is 
denoted as RS. 
shows that, for a highly linear problem, (RE approximately equal to one), 
high values of both RS and G are required for overall achievement to 
approach the upper limit RE. In a recent paper, Hammond and Summers, 
( 1 9 7 2 ) , argue that G provides an index of the subject's "knowledge" of 
of the properties of the task, while RS provides an index of his 
"cognitive control" over that knowledge. Since G and RS may be shown 
to be statistically independent, this formulation offers the intriguing 
possibility of empirically disentangling the process of acquisition 
and application of understanding in complex inference tasks. Unfortun­
ately, the formulation appears to be limited to linear tasks, for which 
The general lens model equation (Hursch, Hammond and Hursch, 
(196U)): 
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C is zero. Given the rather tentative status of the Hammond and Summers 
interpretation of G and RS their terminology will not be adopted here. 
Some Illustrative Lens Model Research 
The conceptual framework reviewed thus far has generated a very 
considerable body of empirical research. A recent partial review of 
this work (Slovic and Lichtenstein, (1971)) notes several hundred 
papers based on the lens model, and related work using Bayes Theorem 
as the central model. Clearly, no exhaustive review of this work is 
intended here; the Interested reader Is referred to such sources as 
Hammond, (1966), and Slovic and Lichtenstein, (1971). The present 
section will review a highly selected subset of this literature, with 
a view to suggesting the value of the lens model formulation as a 
stimulus to empirical research. 
The first topic considered here will be the ability of people 
to learn to use linear cues appropriately in a multiple cue decision 
task. Lee and Tucker, (1962), studied this first topic by putting 
subjects in a situation where they would have to define a card handed 
them as being an X card or not an X card, where X cards had certain 
characteristics that differentiated them from non X cards. Three 
different conditions were studied. The results of Lee and Tucker, 
(1962), led them to the conclusion that people can combine pertinent 
cues and that the people learned to weigh the more important probabilist 
cues more, in making judgements. 
Uhl, (1963). studied a situation where subjects tried to predict 
a response resulting when three stimuli occurred. The subjects looking 
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at rows of lights had to predict the correct criterion light that would 
come on. The criterion light was related to the three stimuli lights 
by a multiple regression equation. This meant the subject had to learn 
the beta weights. The results showed that subjects can learn to use the 
row of lights to predict the criterion light. It should also be noted 
that the subjects had no knowledge that the spintion was of multiple-
regression form. 
Summers, (1962), presented subjects With different cues simul­
taneously in an effort to try to determine if responses came to depend 
on a particular cue. Summers found that subjects tended to learn to 
use correct cues. The subjects learned to develop weights for cues 
that were close to optimal weights for each cue. 
These and similar studies such as Newton, (1965), Hammond, 
Hursch and Todd, (196U), and Todd and Hammond, (1965), suggest that 
people do have the ability to learn how to use linear cues. The 
studies indicate that subjects can develop appropriate weights. In 
other words, subjects learn which probabilistic cues are more important. 
Another area of interest is the difference in learning ability 
in nonlinear and linear functional relationships. Summers, Summers 
and Karkau, (1969)3 studied this area by having the subjects deal with 
two cues. The two cues were related to the criterion variable by 
four different functional relationships. The four functional relation­
ships were each defined as a condition requiring the prediction of "age" 
from two numerical cues, c. and cQ, and appear as the following: 
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Condition 1; age ^ (Cx + C 2 - 2 ) + V 
Condition 2; age ^ (c xc 2 - 1 ) + V 
Condition 3; age 
Condition V; age 
The results of this study indicate that a difference in learning occur­
red for each of the conditions. However, performance increased for all 
types of feedback but the accuracy of the response over conditions 
differed. Subjects in nonlinear conditions learned to use the cues to 
predict the criterion variable. Thus this study indicates that subjects 
learn to predict the criterion variable no matter how the criterion 
variable is related to the cues. 
Hammond and Summers, (19^5)? divided their subjects into three 
groups. The experimental procedure within the groups was as follows: 
Group 1. "The subjects in group 1 were told simply to make 
inferences on the basis of the two test scores and that accurate pre­
diction was possible." (page 219). 
Group 2. "The subjects in group 2 were told that both linear 
and nonlinear relationships were involved and that the highest accuracy 
possible was contingent upon utilization of both." (page 219) . 
Group 3- T T j The subjects in group 3 .were also provided with 
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information regarding linear and nonlinear relationships; in addition, 
the linear and nonlinear cues were identified." (page 219). 
The subjects were studied in the following task: 
(a) " . . .one cue related in a linear, the other in a non­
linear manner to a criterion." (page 215) . 
(b) " . . . the criterion partly, but not perfectly, predictable 
from either cue alone." (page 215)• 
(c) " . . . the criterion perfectly predictable from appropriate 
utilization of both." (page 215) . 
The following quotes summarize their results: 
1. . . . the nature of the information given the subject deter­
mines whether the linear or nonlinear cue will be increasingly 
utilized during learning. There is a much stronger dependence on 
the linear cue than on the nonlinear cue in the minimum information 
condition. (page 221) . 
2. Overall, there appears to be a tendency to depend more on 
the linear cue. (page 221) . 
3. Although results of previous studies indicate a high degree 
of linearity on the part of the subjects in multiple-cue probability 
learning tasks, the present results indicate that the propensity 
for a highly linear, additive response system is contingent upon 
the subject being presented with a highly linear task system. 
(page 222). 
The last paper to be considered in this area is Summers and 
Hammond, (1966). This paper uses the same task as the Hammond and 
Summers, (1965), paper. The difference occurs in the purpose of the 
research. The purpose of Summers and Hammond, (1966), was to 
. . . study multiple-cue probability learning in tasks involving 
nonlinear as well as linear cue-criterion relations and to study 
the effects of different levels of linear and nonlinear task variance 
and different task instructions upon, (a) Subject's inductive 
achieyement and (b) Subject's cue dependence in a task which re­
quires the utilization of both linear and nonlinear cue-criterion 
relations if perfect accuracy is to be achieved. (page 753)-
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Summers and Hammond, (1966), report: 
The major findings of this study are that (a) both achievement 
and cue dependence are affected by task information and task 
properties and that (b) subjects can learn to make inferences 
from nonlinear as well as linear task relations. (Page 756). 
Thus, while several studies have examined the impact on perfor­
mance of outcome and cognitive feedback it appears that no available 
research has examined the effect of error prone outcome feedback in 
these tasks. Since it seems that feedback will be significantly error 
prone in a wide range of real-world tasks the effect of such feedback 
on learning and performance is of considerable interest. In the 
following section, two research questions and related hypotheses con­
cerning these effects will be developed. A research design for experi­
mental investigation of these hypotheses will be presented in the next 
chapter. 
Research Questions 
Brunswik, (1952), said feedback kept the organism from a state 
of isolation. In other words, an organism will use previous results to 
guard against the possibility of misinterpreting input signals. For 
example, consider a situation where a person is to combine two cues 
so that his method of combination results in a response that is close 
to the response of some model unknown to him. Then according to 
Brunswik, (1952), the subject will use his feedback to develop a better 
method for predicting this unknown model. If his feedback is error 
prone, the subject's model should decrease in accuracy as the error 
in feedback increases. If the amount of error in feedback varied, 
we would expect high misinformation to result in lower achievement 
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than low misinformation. The first question to be asked is the follow­
ing: 
Ql: Does a change in misinformation cause the subject's 
achievement (RA.) values to decrease? 
To test a level of misinformation given to a subject the YE 
variance must be controlled. Misinformation will be denoted by L and 
it will be defined as the percentage of feedback variable variance not 
accounted for by the variance of YE. Let 
YE = distal variable 
YF = feedback variable 
EF = error in feedback 
Since YE is controlled its distribution, mean and variance are 
known. Also EF is controlled and the YE and EF values are generated 
independently of each other. Define YF = YE + EF, then from the 
independence of YE and EF, it is known that Var(YF) = Var(YE) + Var(EF). 
Independence enables the variance of YF to be separated into two parts. 
Since misinformation was defined as the percentage of feedback variable 
variance not accounted for by the variance of YE the L value can be 
defined as follows: 
The value of L can thus be adjusted by merely changing Var(EF), the 
error variance included in the feedback. The achievement correlation 
values EA will be studied at different L values, for different blocks 
of trials. 
In Appendix IV the RA value is shown (following Tucker, (1964)) 
to be equal to the following: 
where 
A A 
G is the correlation between YS and YE which are estimates from 
their respective regression equations. 
A 
RE is the multiple correlation coefficient between YE and YE. 
A 
RS is the multiple correlation coefficient between YS and YS. 
C is the correlation between the residuals of the regression 
A A 
equations yielding YE and YS. 
Since there is no systematic non-linearity in this task C will approach 
zero (except for sampling error), and equation (l) reduces to 
Hammond and Summers, (1965)? define the linearity of subject's 
A. A 
response as the correlation between YS and YE. This means G can be 
defined as the linearity of a subject's response where response is used 
because G is an indication of how the regression equation of YS fits 
the regression equation YE. 
A pertinent question then is the following: 
(2) RA. = G RS RE 
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Q2: What is. the effect of misinformation on the subject's Gl­
and RS correlation values? 
Hypotheses to be Investigated 
Brunswik, (1952) , stated that people tend to change states of 
behavior. This means that if a subject is getting error in feedback 
he may change his model to fit his incorrect feedback. The result of 
a subject changing his model to fit error in feedback might cause a 
decrease in the subject's achievement. This decrease would be due to 
error in feedback. The first hypothesis then will be as follows: 
Hyp. 1 : As misinformation increases in a multiple-cue proba­
bility learning task under error prone outcome feedback the achievement 
correlation will decrease. 
From equation two it can be seen that if RA is high G and RS must also 
be high but if RA is low there are more possible values for G and RS. 
It would be interesting then to see whether RA varies with G or with 
RS. Hypothesis two is as follows: 
Hyp. 2 : In a multiple-cue probability learning task, the 
change in achievement over various levels of error in feedback will be 
primarily due to the failure of the subject's estimates to fit the 
linear regression equation of his estimates, than to the failure of 
the linear regression equation estimates of the subject's predictions 
of the distal variable to correlate with the linear regression equation 
estimates of the distal variable values. 
Another way of stating hypothesis two is to say that the change 
in RA will be primarily due to RS than to G. The next chapter will 
deal with the experimental design. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS AI© PROCEDURES 
Problem 
The subjects were to make decisions based on the information 
they were provided. They saw three numbers representing point spreads 
of football games that three individual experts published. The subjects 
were told that the experts made their decisions based on perfect game 
conditions. (Where perfect game conditions implies beautiful weather, 
no injuries and good officials, etc.). Also each subject always knew 
which prediction went with which expert. 
The subjects, therefore, saw the three expert predictions and 
then they made their own prediction. Once the subject's prediction 
was recorded feedback was given to the subject. The point spread of 
the game along with the conditions under which the point spread occurred 
were told to the subject. No names were attached to any teams in an 
effort to eliminate bias. The conditions mentioned above that a subject 
received were used to introduce error in feedback. For example, three 
types of game conditions were defined for the subjects as follows: 
Normal Game 
No unusual factors affect the result. This means weather 
conditions are good, injuries are few, etc. Therefore, we would 
expect the experts pre-game predictions to be reasonably good. 
Somewhat Unpredictable Game 
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After writing in the 6, I am told it was a Very Unpredictable Game 
and the point spread turned out to be 20. Then for this experimental 
A number of unusual incidents occurred such as key injuries, 
poor weather conditions, etc. These unusual incidents influenced the 
outcome of the game somewhat. We, therefore, expect the outcome of 
the game to be somewhat different from the expert's pre-game predictions. 
Very Unpredictable Game 
Many unusual incidents effect the outcome of the game. There­
fore, the outcome of the game may be considerably different from the 
experts pre-game predictions. 
The following example was shown to the subjects: 
Example. Suppose I see the following: 
Expert 1 10 
Expert 2 5 
Expert 3 8 
Considering the above I predict the point spread will be 6 which means 
I fill in the answer form as follows: 
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run my data sheet looks as follows: 
# Your Prediction 
Actual 
Result 
1 6 20 
2 
I am now ready to look at three more expert values. 
Experimental Design 
The distal variables generated represented point spreads of 
football games. The point spreads were drawn from a normal distribution 
with mean zero and variance two-hundred and twenty-five, so that they 
were between a plus or minus fifteen points approximately sixty-seven 
percent of the time. 
senting three different expert opinions as to the actual point spread 
that would occur for a football game. These three cue values repre­
senting expert judgements of the point spreads were generated as follows: 
It was decided that the subjects would see three numbers repre-




YE ± E. 
3 
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Where X^, X^, and X^ represent experts and E^, Eg, and E^ represent error. 
In a previous chapter it was mentioned that the YE and E^ are independent. 
The subjects were divided into two different groups. The first 
group saw all N(0, 26) experts while the second group saw two N(0, 36) 
experts and one N(0, 100) expert. A N(0, 36) expert implies the error 
term E. comes from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1 
thirty-six. Because of independence, the variance of the experts pre­
dictions is Var YE + Var E., which means for higher variance in E. 
1 1 
the corresponding expert X^ should be weighed less. In other words, the 
independence enables us to see just how well the second group was able 
to deal with a situation with less reliable information to use. 
It should be noted that the X. are linear functions of YE with 
a small error term. This type of relationship between X^ and YE was 
noted in Chapter I to result in a similified equation for RA. There­
fore, the relationship between YE and the X^ will enable us to study 
the hypotheses. 
When subjects arrive at a response they can do so using either 
an analytical or an intuitive model. The analytical model is one where 
the subject is allowed to develop some formulation such that when given 
inputs for his formulation he can use external sources such as paper, 
pencil, calculators or other computers, while the intuitive model does 
not allow the subject to use these external sources. An intuitive 
model was imposed on the subjects because if a subject used an analy­
tical model he may not change his model as his intuition tells him to 
. . A A 
change. Thus to study the correlation between YE and YS, the 
correlation between YS and YS and achievement an intuitive model was 
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imposed on the subjects. The intuitive model enables us to study the 
latter points by the fact that subjects will change an intuitive model 
at higher levels of error where if the subjects used an analytic model 
they may not change the model. 
After a subject recorded his estimate, he was given feedback. 
The levels of error in feedback were zero, twenty-five and fifty per­
cent. The levels mentioned were chosen because it was felt if a trend 
existed those levels would indicate the trend. It was also felt that 
a subject starting with zero error and proceeding to fifty percent 
error may react differently than a subject starting at fifty and pro­
ceeding downward. The trend that may occur in going from fifty to 
zero can be checked by taking the subject back to fifty percent error. 
So for the two groups we had the following design: 
Experiment 1 (3 experts N(0, 36)) 
Group A 0 25 50 25 0 
Group B 50 25 0 25 50 
Experiment 2 (2 experts N(Q, 36); 1 expert N(0, 100)) 
Group Ax 0 25 50 25 0 
Group Bx 50 25 0 25 50 
An example of just how the error in feedback is determined will 
be given for twenty-five percent. It should be noted the other levels 
are calculated similiarly. The twenty-five percent error is arrived 
at as follows: 
a.) Call up a random number, say Ql. 
21 
b.) If Ql is less than or equal to 0.5 set Ql equal to a 
totally new positive random number. If Ql is greater than 0.5 set 
Ql equal to a totally new negative random number. (This gives fifty 
percent plus or minus and the values are equally likely between plus 
and minus one.) 
c.) Now let X represent the variance of the error value. Then 
for this case 
• 2 5 = X t Var(YE) * 7 5 X = ( ^ 5 )*(Var (YE)) 
But the Var(YE) = 225. So 
X = = 75.000 
. (z> 
or the standard deviation of X = 8.635. 
d.) The feedback value of YF is then set equal to the following: 
YF = YE + Ql*(8.635) 
The experimental design is completed and the method of experimentation 
follows. 
Method of Experimentation 
Subjects 
The subjects were undergraduates at Georgia Institute of Tech­
nology. They were tested in two main groups. Group one consisted of 
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fifteen males and one female. Group two considted of nineteen males and 
one female. The groups were structured as follows: 
Experiment I (All 3 experts N(0, 36)) 
B 
8 subjects 
(0 25 50 250) 
8 subjects 
(50 25 0 25 50) 
Experiment II (2 experts N(0, 3'6); 1 expert N(0, 100)) 
Ax 
10 subjects 
(0 25 50 25 0) 
Bx 
10 subjects 
(50 25 0 25 50) 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was a cardboard box illustrated below. 
Note: This flap was 
swung to the right when 
the subject was to see 
his feedback value. 
Figure 2. Front View of Apparatus 
Inside the box was placed a roll of paper which contained the cue values 
written in black and the feedback value written in red. There were six 
rolls of data prepared, three for experiment one and three different 
rolls for experiment two. Each roll represented thirty trials at a 
23 
particular level of error. The roll was placed in the box and the 
beginning of the roll was pulled upward till three new cue values 
appeared. The procedure was fast and worked quite well. A roll 
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18 
-21 
This column represents 
the feedback 
Figure 3. Data Sheet 
Instructions 
The first group tested was group one. A set of instructions was 
handed to each individual in the group. The actual instructions are 
included in Appendix I. The instructions were read to the group as 
a whole. It should be noted that as the instructions were read the 
experimenter pointed to the apparatus where the subject would see the 
numbers about which he was reading. After reading the instructions, 
any questions were answered and pencils and answer forms were handed 
2h 
out. At this point the group was divided into set A and set B, This 
division was accomplished by merely placing the subjects in the left 
side of the room in set A and placing those not in set A in set B. 
Procedure 
Once the subjects understood the instructions group B was asked 
to go th another room. The experiment was then started on group A. 
Group A first saw thirty trails at zero percent error. For each trail 
each expert value was called out from left to right. The cardboard 
flap was swung to the right after all the subjects had written down 
their estimates. As the flap was swung the experimenter stated team 
A won or lost by the points indicated. The experimenter also indicated 
at this time the conditions under which the outcome occurred. Note 
here that a condition is used as a means of conveying the level of 
error present. We did this because it was felt the subject would have 
a better feel of the error present. Also note team A was not asso­
ciated to any team because we wanted no bias to enter any given decision 
made. After thirty trials at zero percent group A proceeded to twenty-
five and then to fifty percent error. At this time, group B entered 
the room and thirty trials at fifty percent were run on both groups. 
The complete group also had twenty-five and zero percent error run on 
them, in that order. After the zero percent error, group A was asked 
to leave and the experiment was completed on group B at twenty-five and 
fifty percent error. Note when group B re-entered the room the instruc­
tions were reviewed quickly and at all times the subjects could see 
the numbers called out. It might also be of interest to know the 
subjects were kept occupied when they were not involved directly with 
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the experiment. An illustration of the above is below. 
A Leaves 
A 0 25 50 25 0 _t. 
B _ _ f 50 25 0 25 50 B Leaves ± 
B Enters 
Note each 0, 25 or 50 percent error represents a roll of numbers so 
each subject saw the same sets of numbers. 
The experiment on group two was performed exactly like group one. 
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This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section 
will deal with testing the hypotheses while the second section will 
deal with other results that the data yielded. Note that the calcul­
ations of Section I are found in Appendix III in detail along with the 
data. 
Section I 
Hypothesis 1 was previously stated as follows: 
Hyp. 1: As misinformation increases in a multiple-cue probability 
learning task under error-prone outcome feedback the achievement corre­
lation will decrease. 
The data in groups A and B were pooled because at each level of 
misinformation both groups saw the same values, meaning there was homo­
geneity of variance at each level. R. A. Fisher's Z-transformation was 
applied to the raw correlation coefficients before ANOVA was carried 
out. The data considered here are transformed achievement correlations 
obtained over levels of misinformation. A one-way ANOVA was used to 
test if there was a difference in achievement over the levels of mis­
information. The results appear in Table 1. 
The F-ratio is significant at a = 0.05. This means a difference 
in achievement did occur for different levels of misinformation. A 
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Table 1. Mean RA by Level of Misinfomation 
for Pooled Groups A and B 
Level of Misinformation Mean RA Values Sample Size F-Ratio 
0$ O.963 2k 3.3149 
25$ O.96O 32 
50$ 0.954 2k P <: 0.05 
Duncan Multiple Range (DMR) test at a = 0.05 indicated that: 
0$ different from 25$ and 50$ 
25$ and 50$ were not different 
Where 0$ implies error free feedback and 25$ and 50$ imply that the 
feedback was error prone. 
The above results support Hypothesis 1. For groups Ax and Bx, 
where the "bad" expert was added the trends are much more distinct. 
The results for the pooled groups Ax and Bx appears in Table 2. 
Table 2. Mean RA by Level of Misinformation 
for Pooled Groups Ax and Bx 
Level of Misinformation Mean RA Values Sample Size F-Ratio 
0$ 0.956 30 22.973k 
25$ O.897 40 
50$ 0.798 30 P 5 .0.01 
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The F-ratio is significant at a = 0.01. This means a difference 
in achievement did occur for different levels of misinformation. A 
DMR test at a = 0.05 indicated that: 
0$ different from 25$ and 50$ 
25$ different from 50$ 
This means achievement differed over all levels of misinfomation as 
predicted by Hypothesis 1. 
Therefore, from the analysis of the above groups Hypothesis 1 
is strongly supported by these data. 
The second hypothesis was previously stated as follows: 
Hyp. 2: In a multiple-cue probability learning task, the change 
in achievement over various levels of error in feedback will be primarily 
due to the failure of the subject's estimates to fit the linear regres­
sion equation of his estimates, than to the failure of the linear 
regression equation estimates of the subject's predictions of the distal 
variable to correlate with the linear regression equation estimates 
of the distal variable values. 
To test this hypothesis the following correlations were cal­
culated : 
R(RA, G) - The correlation between achievement (RA) and the 
correlation of the linear regression equation estimates of the subject's 
estimates of the distal variable and the linear regression equation 
estimates of the distal variable. 
R(RA, RS) - The correlation between achievement (RA) and the 
correlation of the linear regression equation estimates of the subject's 
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estimates of the distal variable and the actual estimates of the distal 
variable by the subject. 
The following values were obtained for the data for groups A 
and B: 
R(RA, G) = O.659U36367 denote R(RA, G) as l± 
R(RA, RS) = O.9U6386516 denote R(RA, RS) as p g 
Notice that R(RA, RS) > R(RA, G). TO test the statistical significance 
of this difference we apply a Z-transformation and use the data listed 
in Table 3. 
Table 3- Data Needed to Calculate W 
1 2 




n. - 3 77 77 
2 i(n. - 3) 60.96980492 138.2892765 
2 W = .Z, (n. - 3)(z. - z)2 distributed as X 2 1 df 1=1 1 1 '
w = 38.7756059 
W can not be accepted at cv = 0.0001. This means that R(RA, G) ̂  R(RA, 
RS). Therefore, hypothesis two is verified for groups A and B. 
3 0 
For groups Ax and Bx the following correlations were obtained: 
R(RA, G) = 0 .705^61256 denote R(RA5 G) as ^ 
R(RA, RS) = 0.98590^209 denote R(RA, RS) as P 2 
As before R(RA, RS) > R(RA, G). Again, a Z-transformation was applied 
to test for a significant difference between R(RA, G) and R(RA, RS). 
The data needed to test H : pn = p_ can be found in Table h. 
o 3 Kl
 K 2 
Table k. Data Needed to Calculate W 
1 2 
Pi 0 . 7 0 5 ^ 6 1 2 5 6 O . 9 8 U 9 0 U 2 0 9 
Z . 
1 0 . 8 7 8 0 9 0 1 6 5 8 2 . U 7 3 9 7 6 6 8 U 
n. - 3 9 7 9 7 
Z i ( n . - 3 ) 8 5 , l 7 W 6 o 8 2 3 9 . 9 7 5 7 3 8 3 
2 
W = (n. - 3)(z. - z ) 2 distributed as X 2 1 df i=l 1 X 1 
w = 1 2 3 . 5 1 9 ^ 2 0 5 
W can not be accepted at a = 0.0001. This means that R(RA, G) ̂  R(RA, 
RS). Therefore, hypothesis two is verified for groups Ax and Bx. 
There is a significant difference between R(RA, G) and R(RA, RS) 
in both groups A and B and Ax and Bx. Also for both sets of groups, 
the correlation between achievement and the correlation of the linear 
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regression estimates of the subject's estimates of the distal variable 
and the actual estimates of the distal variable by the subject (R(RA, 
RS)) was higher indicating that performance degradation is primarily 
due to the failure of the subject's estimates to fit the linear regres­
sion equation of his estimates, than to the failure of the linear 
regression equation estimates of the subject's predictions of the distal 
variable to correlate with the linear regression equation estimates 
of the distal variable values. More briefly, using the Hammond and 
Summers (1972) terminology discussed earlier, we could say that, in 
this task, performance degradation with increasing feedback error is 
primarily due to loss of "cognitive control" (RS) rather than to loss 
of "Knowledge" (G). 
In this section both major hypotheses have been supported. 




It was previously stated that group A subjects were presented 
misinformation in the following order: zero, low, high, low, zero. 
The correlations RA, G, and RS where totaled and averaged. The averages 
appear in Table 5 and are plotted in Figure 4. 
The value of G stays very stable over all levels of misinformation. 
Since G is very close to one, the subject's estimates must be approxi­
mately as linear as the distal variable values. However, RS is less 
than G indicating that the subject's estimates are not completely 
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linear. Note RS is relatively constant as is RA. The effect of mis­
information in feedback on group A can not be clearly seen. 
Table 5. Average Values Over Subjects of Group A 
0 25 50 25 0 
RA • 970 • 956 .950 .95^ .9^6 
G .997 .996 .992 .996 .992 
RS .9&k .981 .976 .983 .965 
l.o + 
O 2? ?o 
/d/e/r of j?//- j/7£or/»3/sos7 
Figure k. Average Values G, RS, and RA 
of Subjects of Group A Group B 
Subjects in group B were presented misinformation in the follow­
ing order high, low, zero, low, high. The RA, RS, and G values were 
averaged over all the subjects of group B. The averages appear in 
Table 6 and are plotted in Figure 5• 
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Table 6. Averages Over Subjects of Group B 
50 25 0 25 50 
RA .946 .961 .975 .965 .965 
G •995 .998 .997 .998 .995 
RS .967 .986 .995 .985 .984 
-i—*-
so 2f o *r 
Figure 5. Average Values G, RS, and RA 
of Subjects of Group B 
RS approaches G very fast, however, RS decreases slightly as 
the level of misinformation increases. The effect of misinformation 
in feedback on group B cannot be clearly seen. 
Groups A and B do show slight trends that indicate misinformation 
hinders performance. Because of the one "bad" expert in groups Ax and 
Bx the slight trends should become distinct trends. As will be seen 
this is exactly what happened indicating that the added source of 
error hindered the subjects. 
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Group Ax 
The difference between group Ax and Group A was that group Ax 
had one "bad" expert. This "bad" expert had a larger error variance 
than the other experts. The correlations RS, RA, and G were averaged 
overall the subjects of group Ax. The averages appear in Table 7 and 
are plotted in Figure 6. 
Table 7. Average Values Over Subjects of Group Ax 
0 25 50 25 0 
RA • 958 .912 .885 .926 .962 
G .996 .989 • 979 .988 .998 
RS .978 .961 .923 .96U .979 
1 1 1 1 I—*-
/ e v e & o f / n ? i t V a s ? 
Figure 6. Average Values G, RS, and RA 
of Subjects of Group Ax 
The level of misinformation here has a definite effect on RA, 
RS, and G. It is noted that as the level of misinformation increases 
RA decreases and as the level decreases RA increases. The correlation 
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between the linear regression equation estimates of the subject's 
predictions of the distal variable and the linear regression equation 
estimates of the distal variable values seems to remain fairly constant 
but the correlation between the subject's estimates and the linear 
regression equation of his estimates seems to vary inversely with level 
of misinformation. 
Group Bx 
Group Bx had the same added source of error as Group Ax. The 
correlations RS, RA, and G were averaged overall the subjects of group 
Bx. The averages appear in Table 8 and are plotted in Figure 7 . 
Table 8. Average Values Over Subjects of Group Bx 
50 25 0 25 50 
RA .795 .897 .949 .852 .715 
G .952 • 983 •991 • 990 .961 
RS .854 .937 • 973 .902 .792 
1.0 • 
Figure 7. Average Values G, RS and RA 
of Subjects of Group Bx 
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RS and RA are seen to vary inversely with misinformation. How­
ever, it is noted that the trends are much more distinct for Group Bx 
than grqup Ax. This may have occurred because the subjects of group 
Bx starting at a high misinformation level never developed an intuitive 
model of the problem. At any rate, misinformation clearly hindered 
achievement and the correlation between the subject's estimates and 
the linear regression equation of his estimates. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
Subjects With Three N(0,36) Experts 
In section II Figures K and.5 indicate that subjects realized a 
linear model was best. However, the RS values of the subjects are 
generally below their G values. This means the subject was using a 
model that did not predict the distal variable as well as a linear 
model would have. The following major hypotheses were supported: 
Hyp. 1: As misinformation increases in a multiple-cue pro­
bability learning task under error prone outcome feedback the achieve­
ment correlation will decrease. 
Hyp. 2 : In a multiple-cue probability learning task, the change 
in achievement over various levels of error in feedback will be primarily 
due to the failure of the subject's estimates to fit the linear regres­
sion equation estimates of the subject's predictions of the distal 
variable to correlate with the linear regression equation estimates of 
the distal variable values. 
Subjects With Two N(0, 36) Experts and One N(0, 100) Expert 
The one "bad" expert added another source of error to the problem. 
Because of this added error clear effects of misinformation were expected. 
As can be seen in Figures 6 and 7 of Section II this is precisely what 
happened. 
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As the subjects went from zero to high misinformation his G and 
RS values dropped. The subject's linearity of prediction seemed to 
improve rapidly as the level of misinformation decreased. It was clear 
that misinformation did cause the subject's predictions to decrease 
in accuracy. 
For subjects starting with high misinformation G starts low 
and increases rather fast. However, the second time the subject sees 
increased misinformation his G values seem to decrease less rapidly. 
But the subject's linearity of prediction decreases faster. This is 
probably caused by the fact the subject's did not develop a linear model. 
The effect of misinformation again was to hamper the subject. 
The level of misinformation definitely affects the subject's 
achievement. Subjects tend to achieve less at high misinformation 
levels than at low levels. This decrease in achievement was due primar­
ily to the failure of the subject's estimates to fit the linear regres­
sion equation of his estimates. A subject, therefore, seems to use a 
non linear model when he receives error in feedback. The subject's 
seem to know a linear model predicts best but they just cannot apply it 
correctly. 
The subjects in groups Ax and Bx tended to fluctuate much more 
than groups A and B. Fluctuate is meant to imply that trends are more 
distinct. This implies that subjects beginning at low levels of error 
first tend to develop a model that they can apply at higher levels of 
error. 
Summary of Findings 
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The data reported here provided strong support for the two major 
hypotheses: that performance is degraded by increasing feedback error 
and this degradation is primarily attributable to the failure of the 
subject's estimates to fit the linear regression equation of his estimates 
under high error in feedback conditions. The impact of error in feed­
back on the correlation between the linear regression equation estimates 
of the subjects predictions of the distal variable and the linear 
regression equation estimates of the distal variable values was hardly 
noticeable. 
Two suggestive secondary findings should also be noted. First, 
there is some evidence that performance degradation with increasing 
feedback error is smaller for subjects who initially learn under error-
prone feedback (Groups A and Ax, Blocks 1-3) than for those who initially 
learn under error-prone feedback (Groups B and Bx, Blocks 3-5)- Second, 
there is a strong suggestion in these data that the phenomena noted here 
are highly sensitive to changes in problem structure. The apparently 
minor change of introducing slightly more error in one cue led to con­
siderably more variation over treatments in all three major measures 
of performance in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. 
Recommendations 
The findings of this study can be applied to several areas. Two 
of these areas will be discussed. First? consider the interface of man 
and machine. Goldberg, (1962), Bowman, (1963)9 and Kunreuther, (1969), 
indicate that machines can be programmed with models that out-perform 
man in certain decision making situations. In this study, it was 
ko 
found that a linear model outperformed the subject. However, the 
linear regression estimates of the subject's predictions were highly 
correlated with the linear regression estimates of the distal variable. 
This means the subject's estimates should have been very good predictors, 
but the subject's estimates were not that accurate. A possible reason 
for the subject's failing to use only a linear model was given by 
Goldberg, (1968), and Bowman, (1963). Bowman, (1963)? reports that 
. . . Man seems to respond to selective cues in his environment -
particular things seem to catch his attention at times (the last 
telephone call), while at other times it is a different set of 
stimuli. Not only is this selective cueing the case, but a thres­
hold concept seems to apply. He may respond not at all up to some 
point and then overrespond beyond that. It is this type of beha~vior 
which helps explain the variance in the organization's (or its 
management's) behavior. (page 316). 
Bowman, (1963)5 clearly points out that man has inconsistencies which 
are not found in machines. The question to consider is how man can 
use the machine to better his decision making model. Of course, man 
does not know the model that he uses but possibly practice making 
decisions with a lens model type program will have a lasting effect 
on the subject. The persistence over time of such improved performance 
is an area for further empirical study. 
The second area to consider is the type of informational milieu 
in which the manager should be trained. It was seen that subjects 
starting with high error in feedback did not do as well when returned 
to the error condition as those starting with zero error in feedback. 
These data would indicate that subjects should be trained with the 
"best" feedback possible. The amount of feedback that is needed should 
be studied. Also it would be interesting to see if a subject who 
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practiced at zero error in feedback over five blocks would outperform 
a subject who practiced at a low level of error in feedback when both 
subjects were tested over several blocks at a high level of error in 
feedback. The present data provides some tentative support for train­
ing decision makers in "classroom" milieus where error-less feedback 
can be provided, rather than in "real-world" settings. Again further 
empirical study across a range of problems, settings, and subjects 
would be required before this suggestion could be applied practically 




You are about to participate in an experiment in which you will 
make decisions based on the information you are provided. You will see 
three numbers. These numbers will represent point spreads of football 
games that three individual experts have published. Now the experts 
made their decisions based on perfect game conditions. (Where perfect g a m e c o n d i t i o n s i m p l i e d beautiful w e a t h e r , n o i n j u r i e s and g o o d o f f i c a l s , 
etc.). You'll be told which number goes with which expert. 
You are to write down your prediction of the point spread based 
on perfect game conditions. Once you have made an estimate, you'll 
be told the actual result of the game along with the conditions under 
which the point spread occurred. For example, a quarterback may have 
broken his collarbone in the first quarter. Because of this incident 
the expert's estimates along with your may be different from the point 
spread that resulted. However, you made your estimate without knowing, 
the quarterback would break his collarbone so don't get discouraged 
if you differ from the point spread that occurred. 
You'll receive answer forms and pencils. Please note you are 
not allowed to write anything down except your estimate of the point 
spread and the feedback value you are told after you made your 
estimate. 
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Before considering an example note that each time you see three expert 
estimates they represent estimates for different games. Now even the 
experts don't call every game exactly, hut their predictions are some­
times better than others. We will consider three different kinds of 
games. 
Normal Game 
No unusual factors affect the result. This means weather con­
ditions are good, injuries are few, etc. Therefore, we would expect 
the experts pre-game predictions to be reasonably good. 
Somewhat Unpredictable Game 
A number of unusual incidents occurred such as key injuries, 
poor decisions, poor weather conditions, etc. These unusual incidents 
influenced the outcome of the game somewhat. We therefore expect the 
outcome of the game to be somewhat different from the expert's pre-
game predictions. 
Very Unpredictable Game 
Many unusual incidents effect the outcome of the game. There­
fore, the outcome of the game may be considerably different from the 
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experts pre-game predictions. 
Example. Suppose I see the following: 
Expert 1 10 
Expert 2 5 
Expert 3 8 
Considering the above I predict the point spread will be (6) which 







^ v - ' 
» , 
After writing in the (6) I am told it was a Very Unpredictable Game 
and the point spread turned out to be (20). Then for this experimental 
run my data sheet looks as follows: 
# Your Prediction 
Actual 
Result 
1 6 20 
2 
I am now ready to look at three more expert values. 
DATA 
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APPENDIX IV 
RA = Cov(YE YS)/ V Var(YE) V Var(YS) 
MATHEMATICS OF LENS MODEL 
Achievement Correlation RA 
The contents of Appendix IV is taken from an article by Tucker, 
(1964) , which is based on an article by Hammond, Hursch and Summers, 
(1964) . 
To simplify the algebra involved the random variables YE, YS, 
/ » A . . . a r e s t a n d a r d i z e d . The variables YE and YS are calculated 
by multiple regression techniques. The multiple regression equations 
take the following form: 
YE = B _X T •+ . . ....+ B X 
e,l 1 e,N N 
YS = B X + . . . + B .X T 
x,l 1 x,W N 
* A 
From elementary statistics YE = YE + ZE and YS = YS + ZS where ZE and 
ZS are residuals and Var(YE) = (RE)2; Var(YS) = (RS)2. Also it is 
2 
known from elementary statistics that Var(ZE) = 1 - (RE) and Var(ZS) = 
1 - (RS)2. 
Previously in the text RA was defined as the correlation 
between YE and YS so 
6l 
but 
Var (YE) = Var(YS) = .1 
so 
RA = Gov (YE YS) = E(YE YS.) 
but 
(YE YS) = E (B nX n + . . . + B __X__ + ZE)(B nX_ + . . . + B . X v ' L v e,l 1 e,iTN s,l 1 s,N n 
+ ZS )~ 
= E 
N 
( Y B .B .X.X.) + E(ZEZS) z_je,is,jij 
(YE YS) = I B e ?. 
i,0=l 
B . E(X.X.) + E(ZE ZS) 
From elementary statistics the correlation coefficient p is defined 
as follows: 
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To use the results above some new terms will be defined. 
Let C be the correlation between the residual values ZE and 
ZS. 
A A 
Let G be the correlation between YS and YE. Then 
C V Var(ZE) V Var(ZS) = E.(ZE ZS) 
Substituting for Var(ZE) and VAB(ZS) the E(ZE ZS) equals the following 
expression: 
E(ZE ZS) = C \l 1 - (EE ) 2 V 1 - (RS) 
Now 
N N N 
) B .X.B .X. = ) B .X. ) B .X. = YE YS 
u e , i i s . j j u e , i I u s , j j 
i,j=l i=l j=l so 
N 
E( Y B .B .X.X.) = E(YE YS) 
i _ , e , i s , j • I j 
I J J = L 
G V Var(YE)V Var(YS) 
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Y B . B E(X.X.) = G RE RS 
U e,i s,j 1 j 
Hence 
RA = G RE RS + C V 1 - (RE ) 2 V I - (RS ) 2 
Thus 
= RA - G RE RS 
V 1 - (RE)2 V 1 - (RS)2 
Now to see if man out performs the model or vice versa we need 
to define two more terms. 
A 
Let RM be the correlation between YS and YE. This means RM is 
the validity coefficient of the linear model of the subject. 
Let A be the differential validity of model over man that is 
A = RM - RA. 
Substitute RM for RA in 
RA = G RE RS + C V 1 - (RE)2 V 1 - (RS)2 
But since RM is Cov(YS, YE) we get RS = R(YS, YS) = 1, thus 
6h 
RM = G RE 
A = G RE - (G RE RS + C V 1 - (RE)2 V 1 - (RS)2 ) 
or 
A = G R E ( 1 - R S ) - C V 1 - (RE)2 V 1 - ) 2 
Therefore if A > 0 then 
G RE(1 - RS) > C V 1 - (RE)2 V 1 - (RS ) 2 
which means the model out performed man. 
If YE is linear then RE = 1 and the right side goes to zero 
telling us to use the model. 
As RS goes to 1 man becomes more predictable by a linear model 
and thus there is less difference between him and the linear model. 
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